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In several European merger cases competition authorities have demanded that the merging 
firm auctions off virtual capacity. The buyer of virtual capacity receives an option on an 
amount of output at a pre-specified price, typically equal to marginal cost. This output is sold 
in the market in competition with the merging firm. The paper compares sale of physical and 
virtual capacity by the merging firm and shows that virtual capacity leads to a less 
competitive outcome. The merging firm can build up a reputation for producing little, so that 
the output price increases in the market, and this increases the auction price on virtual 
capacity. 
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It is common in merger cases that the competition authority requires dom-
inant ￿rms to sell o⁄ capacity, so that its market share does not grow (too
much). Recently, several European merger cases in electricity markets have
resulted in the sale of virtual capacity in the form of so called Virtual Power
Plants (VVP). The aim of this paper is to investigate, whether the compet-
itive e⁄ects of these requirements are as good as the selling of real physical
capacity. In particular, we will be interested in reputation building and tacit
collusion. Tacit collusion - or coordinated interaction - is a major worry in
merger cases; see for instance the horizontal merger guidelines published by
Department of Justice (1997) and the European Union (2004).
Virtual capacity is an option to buy products (e.g. electricity) at a pre-
determined price per unit (typically equal to marginal cost), which the buyer
then sells in the ￿nal product market in competition with the producer.
In the European electricity examples, auctions are held at regular intervals
(several times a year).
When the virtual capacity is auctioned, the recipient of the revenue is the
large merging ￿rm. If the auction is e¢ cient, the price for the virtual capacity
will equal the expected pro￿t - suitably adjusted for risk etc. - from having
access to the capacity. So although the merging ￿rm meets competition in
the market from the virtual competitor, it will pocket the pro￿ts made by the
competitor in the auction. This potentially has e⁄ects on the competition.
The paper investigates this.
The paper provides a simple model of a market with one producing ￿rm.
The producing ￿rm ￿rst auctions o⁄ virtual capacity and then the ￿rm and
the virtual producer competes in the market. For simplicity we consider a
Cournot model, where the ￿rms choose production and the price is set in
2the market. We ￿rst consider a static market. There the competitive e⁄ects
of introducing the virtual producer are equivalent to those of introducing an
independent producer who owns his capacity. The reason is simple. Once
the auction is held, the payment in the auction is sunk and everything is as
if there are two independent ￿rms in the market. In line with the European
examples alluded to, we consider the case where the virtual capacity is small
relative to the market, so that the virtual producer wants to market his whole
capacity. In principle one could conceive of large virtual producers, but this
has not been demanded by competition authorities yet and is left for future
research.
Typically, virtual capacity is not auctioned o⁄ once and for all, but a
sequence of auctions are held. We therefore consider long run e⁄ects and
reputation building when the merging ￿rm has to auction o⁄virtual capacity
repeatedly. Since the virtual capacity typically is auctioned o⁄ for relatively
short periods and there are many bidders, we ￿rst consider the case where the
virtual producers are short run players, who just market whatever capacity
they have. Short run players will not consider participating in tacit collusion.
Clearly, this makes it more di¢ cult to maintain pro￿ts above the competitive
level. In the standard case with two independent ￿rms, such pro￿ts cannot
be implemented without the cooperation of both ￿rms. If one ￿rm plays a
best response, the best the other can do is to play best response and this
results in the Cournot equilibrium. With virtual capacity this logic breaks
down. Since the big (merging) ￿rm sells the virtual capacity it will pocket
the expected pro￿t to be earned on the virtual capacity. If it acts moderately
in the market and lowers production, the price will rise. In fact it can induce
the monopoly price by reducing its own sales to the monopoly output minus
the virtual capacity it has sold o⁄. Then the market price will equal the
3monopoly price, and the virtual producer will net the monopoly price minus
marginal (virtual) cost times virtual capacity. In a repeated game where
this happens in each period, the large ￿rm can thus build a reputation for
inducing the monopoly price and the participants in the auction will realize
this. The revenue of the large ￿rm will equal the high earnings of the virtual
producer. In this way the large ￿rm can realize the whole monopoly pro￿t.
Of course, it has an incentive to deviate in a given period. When it has
auctioned o⁄the virtual capacity in a period, there is an incentive to produce
more than the low level giving rise to the monopoly price. However, there
will be a future punishment, as future bidders in the auction will realize
that monopoly pro￿ts cannot be earned in the market; they will only bid the
virtual producer￿ s Cournot pro￿t. We show that this punishment is su¢ cient
for the big producer to restrain production and maintain monopoly pro￿ts if
the discount factor is su¢ ciently high. This is a very general result, which
just assumes that the monopoly pro￿t exceeds the Cournot pro￿t.
We also show that if the discount factor is lower than the crucial value,
which allows the ￿rm to reap the monopoly pro￿t, the highest obtainable
price and pro￿t are increasing in the discount factor. We show that reputa-
tion building is not a⁄ected if the small ￿rm is a long run player. Since the
small ￿rm￿ s future pro￿ts are zero - all future pro￿ts are spent in the auction
buying the virtual capacity - there is no punishment avaliable if it deviates
from collusive play. Therefore there are no equilibria, where the small ￿rm
partipates in tacit collusion when it has virtual capacity.
The analyisis here suggests that reputation building is something the
competitive authorities should worry about. Reputation building in theory
takes an in￿nitely repeated game. In a ￿nite game, the e⁄ects analysed in this
paper do not arise in equilibrium. However, it is well known from experiments
4- see e.g. Selten and Stoeker (1986) - that even in ￿nite - but long games -
reputation and tacit collusion are observed. Hence, there are good reasons to
believe that the reputation building analysed in this paper can take place in
reality even when the horizon is ￿nite. Experimental evidence also shows that
as the end game approaches, reputation and tacit collusion breaks down. The
temptation to deviate becomes too high. For practical purposes, competition
authorities are therefore advised not to make the period on which the adverse
e⁄ects of a merger is countered by virtual capacity too long.
The longer the duration of a contract for virtual capacity, the longer
can the merging ￿rm reap the bene￿ts of deviating before it is punished in
the upcoming auctions. This incentive to deviate undermines the reputation
building. In order to hinder reputation building it is therefore advisable that
the authorities make contracts for virtual capacity with a long duration.
In conclusion the analysis here lends support to the view that contracts
for virtual capacity should have a relatively long duration and that it is not
advisable to continue with auctions for virtual capacity inde￿nitely.
If the small ￿rm is an independent producer, who owns his own capacity,
and the ￿rm is short sighted, tacit collusion as well as reputation buliding
are impossible. It therefore follows that virtual capacity in itself facilitates
reputation buliding if the small ￿rm is a short run player.
Of course, one may argue that if the small ￿rm owns its own capacity,
it will be more reasonable to consider the case where it participates in tacit
collusion. In this case it will be in the market for many periods, and be
interested in future pro￿ts. A non-trivial question here is how the ￿rms share
production - and pro￿ts - when they collude on the monopoly outcome. We
￿rst assume that they split the market in the same proportion as they do
in the Cournot equilibrium. This would for instance be the case in a split
5the surplus bargain where the Cournot outcome is the threat point. This
complicates the model somewhat, and we resort to a linear speci￿cation. For
this case we show that the minimum discount factor allowing collusion for
monopoly pro￿ts is higher than the discount factor which allows the merging
￿rm to build a reputation for maintaining monopoly pro￿ts when capacity
is virtual. So in this comparison, virtual capacity also facilitates collusion.
However, one may object that the ￿rms may choose another sharing rule for
the pro￿ts, if they cannot uphold collusion. We therefore consider the case
where the ￿rms share the market such that collusion is most easy to sustain.
We show that it is not possible to maintain collusion on the monopoly pro￿t
when the discount factor is as low as the lowest allowing reputation buliding
for monopoly pro￿ts with virtual capacity.
As stated above, virtual capacity has been introduced in a number of
recent European merger cases. In relation to Electicite de France￿ s (EDF)
purchase of 34,5% of the shares in the German utility EnBW, EDF agreed
to make 6.000 MW of virtual capacity available in France by November 2003
in order to increase competition in the market. EDF was at the time selling
to around 90% of the so-called free costumers in the French market. The
virtual capacity is to be auctioned to companies who will act as sellers in
the French power market. The contracts for virtual capacity have durations
of 3, 6, 12, 24 and 36 months. The ￿rst auction for 1.200 MW took place
in September 2001. As of April 2004 11 auctions have been held. The
auctions are organized as ascending clock auctions. Around 30 energy traders
and suppliers competed in previous auctions, which were conducted over the
Internet, with approximately 20 bidders emerging as successful purchasers.
According to agreement with the European Commission, EDF shall pro-
vide virtual capacity for a period of ￿ve years. The French electricity market
6is then expected to have developed so that su¢ cient competition will be
present without the Virtual Capacity (see ElectricitØ de France, 2004).
Due to the Electricity Supply Board￿ s (ESB) dominance in the Irish power
market, the Irish government has initiated the Virtual Independent Power
Producer Auction (VIPP), a form of virtual capacity auction as in France.
The auctions - where independent suppliers can bid for 600 MW out of a
total of 4.500 MW - are intended to reduce ESB￿ s market power until more
independent suppliers enter the market (see European Commission, Madrid
Forum, 2002).
In 2003, the Belgian Competition Council approved that a subsidiary of
Electrabel became the default supplier for the customers of several inter-
municipal distribution companies. As Electrabel has a very large market
share in Belgium it was agreed that Electrabel should o⁄er, via auctions,
up to a maximum of 1,200 MW of virtual power plant (VPP) capacity in
Belgium. The terms are to a large extent similar to the French, in particular
capacity shall be o⁄ered for a period of ￿ve years (see Konkurrencestyrelsen,
2004).
The Dutch electricity producer Nuon agreed with competition authorities
that it would auction 900 MW virtual capacity in order to be allowed to buy
Reliant and its 3500 MW capacity. Again there is a ￿ve year limit on the
requirement. The Dutch market size is around 20.000 MW, (Konkurrences-
tyrelsen, 2004)
In March 2004 the large Danish producer Elsam agreed to auction o⁄600
MW virtual capacity in order to be allowed to make an indirect purchase of
36% of the shares in the other big Danish producer E2, see Konkurrences-
tyrelsen (2004). The total Danish market size is about 7000 MW. As in the
other countries auctions are to be held regularly, and for varying durations all
7below three years. The Danish rules specify that a single buyer at most must
acquire 300 MW. The agreement with the competition authorities stipulates
that the virtual producer can buy electricity at the lowest marginal cost
obtainable in the di⁄erent plants owned by Elsam. Contrary to the previ-
ously mentioned cases, the Danish competition authorities required that the
virtual capacity should be provided inde￿nitely. This makes worries about
reputation building potentially more important as there will be no end game
e⁄ects.
There is a long literature on tacit collusion, see Tirole (1991) for an
overview. The detection of tacit collusion in electriciy markets have been
the subject of a number of papers including Green and Newbury (1992),
von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), Wolfram
(1999), and Fabra and Toro (2004). To the best of my knowledge the issue of
virtual capacity and tacit collusion has not been considered in the literature.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model and derives the static solution. Tacit collusion with virtual capacity
and short run players is considered in section 3. Section 4 contains the case
where the small producer is independent. Section 5 o⁄ers some concluding
remarks.
2 Basics: The static market
We consider a market with two ￿rms, a big ￿rm 1, who sells some virtual
capacity q2. The buyer of the capacity, ￿rm 2, is also called the virtual ￿rm.
Both ￿rms sell in a ￿nal market. The amount sold by ￿rm 1 in the ￿nal
market is denoted q1: The price in the ￿nal market is given by the inverse
demand curve p(Q) where Q is total production. For some - but not all - of
8the results we will rely on the linear speci￿cation
p(Q) = a ￿ bQ;
where a and b are two positive parameters. Although Theorem 1 below is
valid under general concavity assumptions, we introduce the linear speci￿ca-
tion already from the start and give the results for the linear model as we go
along in order to shorten on the presentation. We will state explicitly, when
a result depends on the linear speci￿cation.
In this section we consider a single period, where the timeline is as follows.
First virtual capacity in the amount q2 is sold in an auction. After the
auction, the big ￿rm, ￿rm 1, and the buyer of the virtual capacity, ￿rm
2, competes a la Cournot in the ￿nal market. We assume that there are
su¢ ciently many potential bidders and the auction format is such that the
price of the virtual capacity equals the pro￿t which can be earned in the
￿nal market with the virtual capacity. This is for instance the case if the
auction is an open English auction with at least two independent bidders.
The virtual capacity allows the buyer to request up to q2 units at ￿rm 1￿ s
marginal cost c ￿ 0:
We assume that the amount of virtual capacity, q2; is so small that ￿rm 2
is capacity constrained and wants to utilize all capacity. This assumption is
motivated by the examples discussed in the Introduction, where the virtual
producers indeed are small.
We solve the static model for the subgame perfect equilibrium, as usual
by solving backwards. After the auction, ￿rm 2 possesses virtual capacity q2
and it sells all q2 units in the ￿nal market. We will verify below that this is
indeed optimal. Given ￿rm 2 sells q2 units, the problem of ￿rm 1 is
max
q1
(p(q1 + q2) ￿ c)q1:










and the total production is therefore
q
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Equation (2) clearly shows that the introduction of virtual capacity lowers
the market price.










(a ￿ c ￿ bq2)q2
2
As mentioned above, we assume that q2 is so low that the virtual ￿rm is
capacity constrained, i.e. that q2 is less than ￿rm 20s best reply to qc
1 (q2):
The best reply to qc
1 (q2) is given by (1) with qc
1 (q2) inserted for q2 on the





















This condition says that q2 should be less than the production level of each
￿rm in the symmetric Cournot equilibrium. With two ￿rms in the market
this implies that q2 should be less than 50 % of the market. This is clearly
ful￿lled in the examples discussed in the Introduction. In the model, we
only include one successful bidder in the auction, whereas in the examples
10discussed in the introduction, there typically were many. As long as the
virtual producers use all capacity, the results derived here would not change
if we introduced more virtual producers with total capacity q2: This would
just lead to a more cumbersome notation, so we refrain from that.
Now we look at the auction stage. The prospective buyers are rational
and foresee that the Cournot equilibrium will arise and that the pro￿t, which
can be earned from the virtual capacity is ￿c
2. Under the assumption that
the auction is competitive, the price of the capacity will equal this pro￿t.











We see that the larger the virtual capacity, the lower is the total pro￿t of
￿rm 1. This is of course just a mirror of the lower price. Virtual capacity
enhances the competitiveness of the static market.
3 Reputation with virtual capacity
In this section we consider the case where the merging ￿rm auctions o⁄
virtual capacity repeatedly and consider reputation building by the large
￿rm. There are in￿nitely many periods t = 0;:::;1:
At ￿rst we will assume that the auction format and the many participants
in the auction means that the winner of the virtual capacity has a short
horizon. She can not be sure to win the next auction and will therefore not
be willing to reduce supply in order to raise the price. She will seek to gain
as much as possible and for q2 su¢ ciently small, this means that she will
wish to supply q2. In short, the owner of the virtual capacity is not willing
11to collude, she is a short run player in the language of Fudenberg, Kreps and
Maskin (1990).
Firm 1, however, is a long run player and has an incentive to keep prices
high in the market. We assume that ￿rm 1 discounts future pro￿ts with the
discount factor ￿; where 0 < ￿ < 1; and the ￿rm is interested in the sum of
discounted future pro￿ts.
The participants in the auction has an expectation about the market
price and therefore about the pro￿t, which can be earned using the virtual
capacity. The participants observe previous prices and as time passes, the
expectation for period t may depend on these previous prices. At time t
the expectation about prices for period t is a function of previous prices.
In equilibrium, these expectations are rational, which in this non-stochastic
model means that they are correct1.
A subgame perfect, rational expectations equilibrium of the repeated
game consists of an expectation function for the participants in the auc-
tion, which is correct for all possible histories - including out of equilibrium
histories - and a strategy for the big producer which is sequentially rational
in all subgames.
First, we will ￿nd the condition under which an equilibrium, where ￿rm
1 earns monopoly pro￿ts in the market, exists.
Suppose that the auction participants have the following expectations
function (where they implicitly take into account that the winner of the
1In principle the expectation for period t0s price can depend on the whole history of
the game (productions, pro￿ts, and prices of all previous periods). As will be clear, the
more simple formulation chosen here just simpli￿es the exposition and does not a⁄ect the
results.















is the monopoly price.
The auction participants expect that the price will be the monopoly price
as long as this has been the case in the past (or it is the very ￿rst period). If
they ever see another price, they expect the Cournot price, pc; in all future.
These are trigger expectations, which punishes ￿rm 1 if it ever ￿ oods the
market and makes the price go below pm. If the participants in the auc-
tion are unable to collude on bidding zero, this is the hardest punishment
available. If they can collude on bidding zero for the virtual capacity an
even harder punishment is available2: We will assume that the number of
participants in the auction is su¢ ciently large that such collusion is not pos-
sible. Notice, however, that if such collusion is possible, and ￿rm 1 thus can
be punished even harder than assumed here, this would just make reputa-
tion building easier. In this sense our assumption stacks the deck against
reputation building.
Given the expectations, ￿rm 1 essentially has two options if the monopoly
price pm is expected for a period. Either it can choose qm








is the monopoly output and get the advantage that the price expectation for
the next period will be high. Alternatively ￿rm 1 can deviate to the best
2As is well-known the harder the punishment, the better equilibrium can be sustained.
See Abreu (1988).
13possible production, which equals qc
1 (q2): Then the price will fall, and price
expectations for the future periods will be pc: If ￿rm 1 chooses qm
1 ; and the








This will be the price of the virtual capacity in a period where pm is expected.
If ￿rm 1 chooses qm
1 its total pro￿t, from own production and selling the













If ￿rm 1 chooses qm
1 in each period, it will then realize the monopoly pro￿t in
each period. If ￿rm 1 deviates to qc
1 (q2); total production in the period will
be total Cournot production qc
1 (q2) + q2 and the ￿rm￿ s total pro￿t from the
period will be ￿c
1+ ￿m
2 ; as the virtual producer expected pm and the winning
bid in the auction has been ￿m
2 : In the next period, however, expectations
will be that p = pc, so the winning bid will be ￿c
2 and the pro￿t of ￿rm 1
from that period and onwards will be ￿c
1 + ￿c
2: The no-deviation constraint

























(Recall that when ￿rm one produces qm
1 it restricts output below qc
1; which
is the best reply, so ￿m
1 < ￿c
1).
In general, as long as the monopoly pro￿t exceeds the sum of Cournot



















So if the discount factor ￿ ￿ ^ ￿; it is possible to realize the monopoly pro￿t
through reputation buliding. Notice, importantly, that this result does not
depend on demand and cost being linear. It holds true under general con-
cavity assumptions ensuring existence of Cournot equilibrium and optimum
for the monopolist, as long as monopoly pro￿t exceeds Cournot pro￿t.
Finally, notice that if the discount factor is high and ￿rm 1 chooses qm
1 ; the
expectation that p = pm in each period is correct. If in the past another price
has been observed and the expectation becomes p = pc; then the big ￿rm
can only earn ￿c
2 in all future auctions regardless of its action in a period t.
The optimal level of production is therefore qc
1 (q2) and the price becomes pc
as expected. Hence the price expectation is rational also o⁄ the equilibrium
path. Summarizing the result.
Theorem 1 For any demand and cost function such that the monopoly pro￿t
exceeds the total pro￿t of the Cournot equilibrium the following is true: If the
virtual ￿rm is a short run player, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium,
where the ￿rm 1￿ s total earnings equals the monopoly pro￿t in each period, if
the discount factor ￿ exceeds ^ ￿ given in equation (6).
In the model, the duration of a period equals the duration of the contract
for the virtual capacity. For given time preferences, discount rate r; and
duration of contract for virtual capacity, ￿t; the relevant discount factor is
￿ = exp(￿r￿t):
This is smaller, the longer duration of the contract. A longer contract there-
fore makes it more di¢ cult to ful￿ll the requirement that the discount factor
15exceeds the crucial discount factor ^ ￿: In this sense a longer contract makes
reputation building more di¢ cult.




















This crucial discount factor does not depend on the amount of virtual capac-
ity, q2: Hence, in the linear model, if full reputation building on the monopoly
price is feasible, a larger amount of virtual capacity does not make reputation
building more di¢ cult. While interesting in itself, it is not a general result,
it depends on the linear speci￿cation.
Suppose that the discount factor is less than ^ ￿, so that reputation build-
ing on the monopoly price is impossible. The ￿rm must then settle for partial
reputation building. The best pro￿t, which can be realized, ful￿lls the incen-
tive constraint (5) with equality. This is equivalent to





In order to proceed, we focus on the linear model. Then, we get the condition
(a ￿ b(q1 + q2) ￿ c)(q1 + ￿q2) = ((a ￿ b(q
c
1 (q2) + q2) ￿ c)(q
c
1 (q2) + ￿q2))





￿ (1 + ￿)q2 ￿ q
c
1 (q2)
Inserting into the pro￿t functions and manipulating a bit, we get that the
total pro￿t to ￿rm 1 from partial reputation building is
￿1 + ￿2 =
(a ￿ c)




16For ￿ = 1
2; this gives the monopoly pro￿t as it should. It is increasing in
￿ and decreasing in q2 for ￿ < 1













which is lower than the monopoly price and decreasing in q2 for ￿ < 1
2 and
increasing in ￿: Thus for discount factors below 1
2; larger virtual capacity is
pro-competitive, it lowers the market price and it lowers the total pro￿ts of
the ￿rms.
Theorem 2 Larger virtual capacity is pro-competitive if full reputation build-
ing is not possible. In the linear model with virtual capacity, the highest pro￿t
￿rm 1 can obtain from partial reputation building when ￿ < ^ ￿ = 1
2 is given by
(8) and the price is given by (9). Both is increasing in the discount factor,
￿; and decreasing in the amount of virtual capacity, q2:
We conclude that when the discount factor is so low that it is impossible
to realize the monopoly pro￿t, and the ￿rm has to practise partial reputation
building, then the market becomes more competitive, the larger the virtual
capacity is and the lower the discount factor is.
We have assumed that ￿rm 2 is a short run player, who will not even
contemplate participating in tacit collusion. As we see, even in this case
it is possible for ￿rm one to build a reputation. However, the results will
not change if ￿rm 2 is a long run player. Suppose that it is a long run
player, and the ￿rms try to coordinate tacitly on an equilibrium with high
pro￿ts. Suppose, in particular, that ￿rm 2 is supposed not just to play a
best response. In such an equilibrium there has to be a punishment if ￿rm 2
deviates from collusive play. However, since ￿rm two￿ s future pro￿ts are zero
17- all future pro￿ts are spent in the auction buying the virtual capacity - there
is no punishment avaliable if it deviates from collusive play. Therefore there
are no equilibria, where the small ￿rm partipates in tacit collusion when it
has virtual capacity.
Hence the results of this section do not change even if ￿rm 2 is a long run
player.
4 Tacit collusion when ￿rm two owns its ca-
pacity
In this section we consider the case where ￿rm 2 owns its capacity. If it is
a short run player, then tacit collusion as well as reputation building is not
possible. In this case ￿rm 1 only receives pro￿ts from its own sale, and if ￿rm
2 always plays a best response, ￿rm 1 cannot do better than playing a best
response, which results in the Cournot equilibirum. However, the assumption
that player 2 is a short run player may appear questionable if indeed ￿rm 2
owns its own capacity and is in the market inde￿nitely. We therefore now
assume that both ￿rms are long run players. As we assume that the ￿rms are
not symmetric (￿rm 2 is the small ￿rm) it is an important question how the
￿rms share the monopoly pro￿t in the collusive phase. A natural benchmark
is when the ￿rms share the market in the collusive phase in the same way as
they do in the absence of collusion. This would be the case if one conceives
of equal split bargaining taking as the threat point the non-collusive pro￿ts.






1 (q2) + q2
;
18and the production of each ￿rm in the collusive - monopolistic - phase is qml
1 =
s1Qm;qml




As the formulas become a little heavy-handed, we focus on the linear








































































































































2)(1 + q2 ￿ 2q2
2)













so that the constraint for ￿rm 2 is the most binding constraint.












































We have that ￿i 2 [1








is the Cournot output for ￿rm 2 in this example.
We see that lowest the crucial discount factor allowing full collusion on the






reputation building on the monopoly pro￿t with virtual capacity.
The above analysis rests on the assumption that the ￿rms share the mar-
ket in the collusive phase in the same way as they do in the absence of collu-
sion. However, one could object, that if tacit collusion cannot be maintainted
under this sharing rule and there are other ways of sharing the market, which
makes tacit collusion easier to sustain, the ￿rms will choose to do that. The
20non-deviation constraint is most binding for ￿rm 2 in the above analysis.
The higher is the market share of ￿rm 2; the less is its incentive to deviate.
We will therefore now allow the ￿rms to allocate market shares to facilitate
collusion.
Recall that the monopoly pro￿t is ￿m = 1
4; while monopoly production
is qm = 1
2: Firm 2￿ s capacity is q2; while marketed production from 2 in the
collusive phase is now denoted x2 and ￿rm 1￿ s marketed production is 1
2 ￿x2:








































































































We therefore get that if the ￿rms collude on the monopoly outcome, ￿rm
two￿ s discount factor should at least be higher than ￿2 (x2) ful￿lling
￿2 (x2) =
￿dL
2 (x2) ￿ ￿m
2 (x2)
￿dL
2 (x2) ￿ ￿c
2
=
(2q2 ￿ 1)(x2 ￿ q2)
q2 (2x2 ￿ q2)
which - when it is positive - is decreasing in x2:
Recall that with virtual capacity, a reputational equilibrium, where ￿rm
1 earned the monopoly pro￿t could be sustained if ￿ ￿ 1
2: We will now show
21that tacit collusion on the monopoly outcome can not be sustained if ￿ is as
low as 1
2: If ￿rm two should not deviate when ￿ = 1
2; x2 should at least ful￿ll
￿2 (x2) =
(1 ￿ 2q2)(q2 ￿ x2)

















If ￿rm one shall not deviate, its discount factor should not be less than
￿1 (x2): Inserting for x2 we get get
￿1 =
￿dL
1 (x2) ￿ ￿m
1 (x2)
￿dL






















2 ￿ 12q2 + 4
5q2
2 ￿ 8q2 + 4
For q2 2 [0; 1
3]; we have that ￿1 belongs to [ 9
17;1]: We conclude, that it is not
possibe to sustain tacit collusion at the monopoly pro￿t, if ￿ = 1
2: Hence we
conclude, that while it is possible to sustain a reputation and earn monopoly
pro￿ts for ￿rm 1, when capacity is virtual, and the discount factor equals 1
2;
it is not possible to sustain tacit collusion when ￿rm 2 is a long run player
and has its own capacity when the discount factor is this low. It follows that
reputation building is easier when capacity is virtual.
5 Concluding remarks
Virtual capacity has been a new and interesting feature in major merger
cases. Competition authorities have tried to mitigate the anti-competitive
e⁄ects of mergers by requiring that the merging ￿rm auctions o⁄ virtual
capacity to prospective competitors in the ￿nal market. We have shown
22that indeed in a static setting this has the expected competitive e⁄ects. As
regards the longer run e⁄ects the picture is more blurred. The fact that the
merging ￿rm pockets the pro￿t of the competitor through the initial auction,
gives incentives to moderate production so that the price is kept high, the
value of the virtual capacity is enhanced and so is auction revenue. This
allows it to build a reputation for manitaining monopoly pro￿ts and the
competitive e⁄ects of virtual capacity vanishes. The analysis points to that
a long duration for the contract for virtual capacity increases competiveness
and it points to that it would be good to limit the period in time for which
the competitive remedies rely on virtual capacity.
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